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CONSTITUTIONALIZED?
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ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court last decided a federal income tax
case on constitutional grounds in 1920⎯a century ago. The case was
Eisner v. Macomber, and the issue was whether Congress had the power
under the Sixteenth Amendment to include stock dividends in the tax
base. The Court answered “no” because “income” in the Sixteenth
Amendment meant “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined.” A stock dividend was not “income” because it did not
increase the wealth of the shareholder.
Macomber was never formally overruled, and it is sometimes still
cited by academics and practitioners for the proposition that the
Constitution requires that income be “realized” to be subject to tax.
However, in Glenshaw Glass, the Court held in the context of treble
antitrust damages that the Macomber definition of income for
constitutional purposes “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions” and that a better definition encompassed
all “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”
In the century that has passed since Macomber, the Court has never
held that a federal income tax statute was unconstitutional. This behavior
of the Court constitutes a remarkable example of American tax
exceptionalism, because in most other countries income tax laws are
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subject to constitutional review and are frequently ruled
unconstitutional.
In what follows, we will first examine three examples of how income
tax law is constitutionalized in other countries (Part 1). We will then look
at some of the larger tax expenditures in the U.S. and ask how they would
fare under constitutional scrutiny (Part 2). Finally, we will attempt to
answer the question whether US income tax law should be
constitutionalized, and answer in a reluctant negative (Part 3). But we
will also urge Congress, which is equally charged with upholding
constitutional values, to take horizontal equity more into consideration
when evaluating tax expenditures.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court last decided a federal income tax
case on constitutional grounds in 1920—a century ago. The case was
Eisner v. Macomber,1 and the Court confronted the question of
whether the Sixteenth Amendment2 empowered Congress to include
1. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
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stock dividends in the tax base.3 The Court answered “no,” because
“income” in the Sixteenth Amendment meant “the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined.”4 Because stock dividends
did not increase the wealth of the shareholder, they were not “income”
for the purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment.5
Though the Court never formally overruled Macomber,6 it
effectively did so in Glenshaw Glass.7 There, the Court held that the
Macomber definition of income “was not meant to provide a
touchstone to all future [constitutional] gross income questions” and
that a better definition should encompass all “instances of undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.”8
In the century since Macomber, the Court has never declared a
federal income tax statute to be unconstitutional.9 The Court’s
behavior constitutes a remarkable example of American tax
exceptionalism because in most other countries income tax laws are
subject to constitutional review and are frequently held
unconstitutional.
Why does the United States deviate so significantly from the norm?
A common answer is that the Court became wary of constitutionalizing
income tax law after Macomber, which was widely regarded as wrongly
decided. In particular, tax academics have warned the Court against
constitutionalizing income tax law because that would mean that
Congress could not fix their mistakes. The United States Court of
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
3. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 199.
4. Id. at 207 (quoting Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
5. Justice Brandeis in dissent pointed out that under this reading a cash dividend was not
income either, because it decreases the value of the stock, so the overall wealth of the taxpayer is
not affected. He argued that realization was a matter of administrative convenience, not
constitutional law, and most commentators now accept his view. Id. at 224. Justice Holmes
likewise dissented on the ground that “I think that the word ‘incomes’ in the Sixteenth
Amendment should be read in ”a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time
of its adoption.” For it was for public adoption that it was proposed. The known purpose of this
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt
that most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like
the present to rest. I am of opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax.” Id. at 220.
6. Macomber is sometimes still cited by academics and practitioners for the proposition
that the Constitution requires that income be “realized” to be subject to tax.
7. C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
8. Id.
9. The Court has sometimes held federal non-income taxes to be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dared venture into these
waters in Murphy v. IRS,10 holding that taxing damages for nonphysical injuries was unconstitutional because they were not
“income.”11 The reaction was swift and negative, and the court
ultimately retracted its opinion.12
But this is not the whole story, because the Court frequently
invalidates state tax laws on equal protection grounds13 and on
Commerce Clause grounds.14 In the latter type of cases, even though
Congress can overrule the Court (because it has the authority to
regulate interstate commerce), it rarely does so—meaning that the
Court sometimes finds it necessary to overrule itself.15
The main reason for U.S. exceptionalism in this area is textualism
and the lack of a well-developed doctrine of proportionality. In other
countries where tax laws are subjected to judicial review, an initial
determination that a given tax law deviates from constitutional equal
protection is followed by: (a) an inquiry into legislative purpose (which
would be suspect to textualists); and (b) a determination whether the
deviation from equal protection is proportional to the legislative
purpose, or could be achieved by less restrictive means.16 The Court is
ill-equipped to conduct such an inquiry because it may not be willing
to inquire about legislative purpose, and even if it did, it does not have

10. Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
11. Id. at 92.
12. See, e.g., Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis
of Murphy V. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 186 (2007); Paul Caron, Tax
BLOG
(Aug.
24,
2006),
Protestor
Cases
After
Murphy,
TAXPROF
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/08/tax_protester_c.html; Ellen Aprill, Ruling
Undermines Base of the Federal Income Tax System, DAILY JOURNAL, 2006,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/Aprill.pdf.
13. See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S.
Ct. 2213, 2224 (2019); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 468 (2000); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985);
Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622 (1985); WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S.
117, 121 (1968); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 566
(1935); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 550 (1934); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,
288 U.S. 517 (1933); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 517 (1926).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (2018); Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Oliver Lepsius, Constitutional Review of Tax Laws and the Unconstitutionality
of the German Inheritance Tax, 16 GER. L .J. 1191 (2015); Yoseph Edrey, פרשנות חוקתית וביקורת
(שיפוטית על חקיקה פיסקליתin Hebrew), Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Review on Fiscal
Legislation (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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a well-developed doctrine of proportionality to draw upon. The Court
only has the levels of scrutiny (rational basis, intermediate, strict),
which are not flexible enough to evaluate nuanced tax distinctions,
which require a careful balancing of all the costs and benefits of a
departure from equality.
Several problems arise because the Court refuses to
constitutionalize tax law. One problem is that tax is relegated to be a
technical subject fit only for specialists, rather than a subject at the
heart of the relationship between the state and its citizens. Another
problem is that many deviations from equal protection remain
unexamined and continue unabated because Congress lacks the
political will to limit them, primarily a result of lobbying pressure.
In what follows, we will first examine three examples of how tax law
is constitutionalized in other countries (Part 1). We will then look at
some of the larger tax expenditures in the U.S. and ask how they would
fare under constitutional scrutiny (Part 2). Finally, we will attempt to
answer the question whether U.S. income tax law should be
constitutionalized and reluctantly answer in the negative (Part 3).
However, we will also urge Congress, which is equally charged with
upholding constitutional values, to take horizontal equity more into
consideration when evaluating tax expenditures.
I. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In this part, we will survey how other developed countries
constitutionalize tax law, drawing examples from Germany (where the
practice is most developed), Italy, and Israel.17 The following will show
that although each of these countries defines equal protection
differently under its constitution, they all share a common feature: they
evaluate distinctions between groups of people in the tax law not
against a benchmark of an ideal tax system (as is done in the U.S.), but
rather as deviations from equal treatment under the law. They then ask
whether such deviations are proportional to the goal the legislature
sought to achieve. This method is what the U.S. Congress should
consider following in evaluating tax laws.

17. Some of these examples are from other taxes, but most are from the income tax, which
is the main source of revenue for all of these countries (although VAT is also important). In the
US, because we do not have a VAT, the income tax dominates all other taxes at the federal level.
But the payroll tax is also important and raises equal protection issues as well (e.g., because there
is no link between what you pay and what you receive, why should the tax base be capped, and
why are certain categories of workers exempt?).
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A. Germany
In general, German tax literature views tax expenditures as
legitimate means of implementing social and fiscal policy that are
intended to influence economic behavior.18 Similarly to U.S. law,
German law defines tax expenditures as exceptions to a general
definition of income that results in lower tax revenues.19 Tax
expenditures exist whenever the government fails to exercise its taxing
rights to their fullest extent.20 Nonetheless, unlike the U.S. approach
(which evaluates tax expenditures by comparing them to a normative
base), the German approach interprets the tax statute based on the
principles underlying the choice of income as a tax base, such as an
ability to pay.21 These principles are viewed as giving rise to the choice
of income as a tax base and, as such, provide guidance for structuring
the income tax and for judging individual tax provisions.22
German literature recognizes three groups of structural tax
provisions. The first group includes provisions that are based on
concepts of fairness, ability to pay, and service towards the main
purpose of raising revenue. The scope of this group is determined by
weighing the underlying concepts and principles of the tax system, such
as equity and fairness. Those considerations require that the tax burden
be allocated according to each individual’s ability to pay. Income is
chosen as the base because it is seen as a proxy for one’s ability to pay.
When tax provisions are aimed to correct for differences in ability to
pay, they will fall into this first category.23
The second group contains provisions that are not based on
concepts of equity and fairness (as are reflected in the ability to pay
concept), but that are nevertheless necessary for administrative
purposes. These provisions have become inherent, structural parts of
the tax system.24
The third group includes provisions that are not aimed to account
for differences in ability to pay and that are not based on allocative or
administrative concerns, but instead are intended to fulfill other

18. Harry A. Shannon III, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the United States and Germany:
A Comparison, 33 TAX NOTES 201, 204 (Oct. 13, 1986).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 208.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 207.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 208.
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purposes such as influencing taxpayer’s economic behavior. These are
the provisions that constitute tax expenditures.25 As will be discussed
below, the United States should adopt a similar analysis: one that is
more focused on the underlying principles of the U.S. tax system, such
as fairness and horizontal equity (which in turn are derived from the
ability to pay principle) rather than focusing on the exact components
of a normative tax base.
In the last two decades, the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassunggericht or “German Court”) has on multiple
occasions held German federal tax laws unconstitutional.26 The
principle of equality under Article 3 of the German Constitution (the
“Basic Law”), which is similar to the concept of equal protection in
American law, is the primary constitutional requirement invoked by the
German Court in striking down tax laws. Tax laws usually trump other
basic rights because German law and society view taxes as critically
important: they finance the government and redistribute valuable
resources. Because there is no other way to achieve these two goals
except by taxation, tax laws rarely fail the proportionality test which
also applies to other basic rights.27
Tax expenditures, which distinguish between groups of taxpayers,
are thus subject to the principle of equality. In German constitutional
law, the principle of equality requires that equal things must be treated
uniformly and unequal things must be treated differently. On its face,
any unequal treatment must be based on a rational justification
(rational basis). Under the complementary arbitrariness standard
(Willkuerformel), a difference in treatment is acceptable as long as it is
not arbitrary (i.e., unrelated to the legislative purpose). If this
arbitrariness formula were the only constitutional test, most tax
expenditures would easily withstand constitutional challenges.
However, the principle of equality is also read in conjunction with
other guaranteed rights.28 In the last two decades, the German Court
has developed a higher standard for tax laws that impact other
constitutional protections.29 Under this new formula, the German

25. Id.
26. For an overview, see generally Lepsius, supra note 16.
27. Id. at 1193.
28. VICTOR THURONYI ET AL., COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 72 (2d ed. 2016).
29. The highest level of strict scrutiny is reserved under Article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
Basic Law to discrimination based on sex, belief, race, language, descent, origin, or political
convictions. See Lepsius, supra note 16, at 1194.
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Court requires a stronger justification than rationality or a lack of
arbitrariness to uphold the law’s differential treatment of comparable
conduct. The court evaluates the legislature’s stated policy motives
using the proportionality principle, which is applicable whenever a
deviation from equality relates to other rights, such as freedom of
profession, speech, or assembly. The German Court demands detailed
justifications for any statutory deviations, and merely the will of the
legislative majority is insufficient.30
On the basis of this general methodology, the German Court has
developed a series of specific principles that apply to the constitutional
review of tax laws that aim to influence behavior (regulatory or
“steering taxes,” referred to as Lenkungsteuern) or when the law results
in any distributional horizontal inequalities, such that equally situated
taxpayers pay unequal amounts of taxes.31 These principles include: the
ability to pay principle (Leistungsfaehigkeitprinzip), the strictly net
principle requiring allowance of deductions (Nettoprinzip), the
principle of logical consistency in tax law (Folgerichtigkeit), the
doctrine of self-consistency (Widerspruchsfreiheit), the adherence to
previous concepts (Konzeptbefolgung), and the requirement to typify
the level of taxation (Typisierung). These principles are announced by
the legislature and are derived from the general legislative scheme of
the German tax code.
Applying this type of scrutiny to regulatory taxes has led to
numerous decisions striking down tax laws as unconstitutional. The tax
courts (Finanzgerichte) and the Federal High Tax Court
(Bundesfinanzhof) commonly refer cases to the German
Constitutional Court for a determination of the law’s constitutionality.
This procedure is called “norm control.”
On these bases, in 1957, the German Constitutional Court struck
down joint taxation of married couples (i.e., filing a return together) as
a violation of the right to marriage and the family because it effectively
penalized being married by taxing the lower earning spouse’s income
at a higher progressive rate than what would have applied had she not
been married.32 In 1991, the Court struck down a rule that exempted
interest income from withholding while wages were subject to
30. Id. at 1195.
31. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional
Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 264 (2006).
32. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Ct.] Jan. 17, 1957, 6
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 55, 1957.
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withholding because interest was primarily earned by high income
taxpayers, and the exemption was considered unfair.33 In 1994, the
Court struck down the net wealth tax because the valuation rules as
applied resulted in substantially different valuations for different kinds
of property as compared with their market value.34
In a more recent example, in 2014, the German Constitutional
Court decided a norm control case from the Federal High Tax Court
regarding the constitutionality of the new German inheritance tax
statute.35 In the inheritance tax reform of 2008, a special exemption was
introduced for family-owned businesses.36 The German Court held the
exemption unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to large and
ultra-large private businesses, reasoning that such an exemption
privileged very wealthy persons and led to the concentration of private
fortunes among a limited group of people. The Court held that the
exemption was too broad, was not related to the desire to protect family
businesses, and allowed too many possibilities for contractual designs
to evade taxation.37
Since the inheritance tax decision, the German Constitutional
Court has applied these principles to several other areas of tax law. In
May 2017, it held that parts of the German change of control rules were
inconsistent with the principle of equality because they were arbitrary.38
The change of control rules (as in effect before the Court’s decision)
limited a business’ ability to use the tax loss carry forward if the
business attained more than 50 percent of the targeted acquisition. In
the case of acquisitions between 25 and 50 percent, a pro rata formula
applied. This latter rule was held unconstitutional in a case involving a
48 percent change because it was arbitrary. The Court reasoned that
these rules were based on the principle that the taxable entity wanting
to make use of the loss deduction must be the same as the taxable entity
incurring the loss. The latter rule was arbitrary, according to the Court’s
decision, because there was no rational basis for assuming a change of
identity of the corporation when only 25 to 50 percent of the share
capital was transferred.

33. BVerfG June 27, 1991, 84 BVerfGE 239, 1991.
34. BVerfG June 22, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 121, 1995.
35. BVerfG Dec. 17, 2014, 1 BvL 21/12.
36. Inheritances by natural persons were generally taxed whereas inheritances by legal
entities were not.
37. Id.
38. BVerfG May 12, 2017, 2 BvL 6/11.
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In June 2017, the German Constitutional Court ruled that a tax on
nuclear fuel was unconstitutional.39 The tax, which was introduced in
December 2010, required nuclear operators to pay €145 per gram of
fuel deployed in their reactors. Between 2011 and 2016, it yielded €6.3
billion for the German budget. It was levied every time a fuel rod was
changed and in its early years, allowed the German government to
claim it had balanced the budget for the first time in decades. The case
was a norm control case from Hamburg (i.e., a case referred to the
German Court for review of constitutionality), and the Court held the
tax unconstitutional because of arbitrariness. In other words, the tax
was not sufficiently related to the Legislature’s intended purpose to
reduce the use of nuclear power.
In April 2018, the German Court held that the property tax regime
applied in West Germany was unconstitutional.40 The crux of the
problem, as identified by the Court, was that property tax
determinations in Germany were based on antiquated valuations that
were made over half a century ago: 1964 in the West and 1935 in the
East. The Court ruled on multiple complaints against the property tax
regime, all of which originated in West Germany. Under Section 21 of
Germany’s property tax law, the reassessment of property valuations
must occur every six years; however, this had not occurred since 1964,
when East Germany was still part of the Soviet bloc, as a result of
political tensions.
Although the differences between the valuations of real property
in the East and West created an obvious disparity, it was mitigated by
the fact that municipalities determined the rate at which property taxes
would be levied and made up for the dated land assessments by raising
rates. The constitutional issue arising from the use of the outdated
valuation system was that comparable properties within a municipality
were taxed at different rates depending on the year in which they were
built. The Court determined that this had led to “gravely unequal
treatment” of property owners and was thus unconstitutional under
Germany’s Basic Law
Art. 3 (1) Basic Law always requires equitable interpretation of the
tax base. In order to ensure a uniform burden on taxpayers, the basis
of assessment must be chosen in such a way that it realistically
depicts the burden of taxation in the relation of the assets to each

39. BVerfG June 13, 2017, 2 BvL 6/13.
40. BVerfG Apr. 10, 2018, 1 BvL 11/14.
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other . . . . This applies in particular if the tax is levied at a uniform
tax rate, since inequalities resulting from the assessment can no
longer be corrected or compensated for at a later level of tax
collection. 41

In its decision, the German Constitutional Court required that the
legislature enact and implement a new regime by the end of 2019 and
2024 respectively.42 Until then, the current, unconstitutional system
persists. Overall, these decisions attempted to craft a test for identifying
tax expenditures that distinguish different groups of taxpayers in a way
that violates the constitutional norm of equal treatment. In drawing this
line, the Court did not need to refer to a baseline; it only needed to
consider the distinction among different groups of taxpayers and assess
such distinctions against both horizontal and vertical equity principles.
B. Italy
In recent years, the Italian Supreme Constitutional Court (Corte
Constituzionale) has likewise declared several tax laws
unconstitutional. These cases also illustrate the conceptualization of
tax expenditures as violations of equal protection. Like the German
cases, these decisions illustrate the evaluation of differences among
taxpayers against a norm of equality, rather than deviations from a
normative tax base (such as the Haig Simons definition of income).43
The Italian Court applies a test of arbitrariness in reviewing the
constitutionality of unequal tax treatment. In Sentenza 6/2014,44 the
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Article 1, paragraph 497
of law no. 266/2005 (Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2006), which
governs the tax base in the context of residential real properties
acquisitions at public sales. Italian law imposes a 9 percent tax on the
transfer of residential real estate (“Imposta di Registro,” which is a VAT
substitute). In non-business purchases of residential properties in a
private sale, the taxpayer could elect which base value the tax applies
to, with two options: either by the fair market value of the property at
the moment of the purchase or by reference to the property’s value as

41. Kenneth Hall, Germany constitutional court declares country’s property tax regime
unconstitutional, JURIST (April 11, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/04/germany-highcourt-declares-countrys-property-tax-regime-unconstitutional/.
42. BVerfG Apr. 10, 2018, 1 BvL 11/14.
43. U.S. tax expenditure analysis enerally uses as a normative baseline the definition of
income developed by economists Haig and Simons in the 1930s under which income is the sum of
consumption and the increase in savings.
44. Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014.
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reported in the land registry. In most cases, the taxpayer chooses the
land registry value because it is usually lower, and thus the purchaser
pays less tax. However, a non-business purchaser of a residential
property at a public sale could only use the purchase price to determine
the tax base. In other words, purchasers at public sale did not have a
choice between purchase price or land registry value in determining the
land’s taxable base.
The Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the
distinction between private sale and public sale violated Article 3 of
the Constitution, which codifies the principle of equal treatment.45 The
Court held that the law was unconstitutional because it unreasonably
distinguished between the two groups who were otherwise identically
situated. According to the Court, there was no good reason to prohibit
a non-business purchaser at a public sale from choosing between the
purchase price or the land registry value when determining the
purchased property’s taxable base.46 For the law to have withstood
constitutional challenge, the state would have had to show that the
distinction was not arbitrary—in other words, the legislature would
have to draw distinctions among groups of taxpayers in ways that
servethe law’s intended purpose.
In addition to this basic arbitrariness standard, the Italian Court has
further developed a proportionality test for identifying tax
expenditures that violate equal protection. Under that proportionality
standard, the intent of tax expenditures must be legitimate, and the
means must be reasonably related to that intent. In Sentenza 10/2015,47
the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Legislative Decree
June 25, 2008, no. 112, which increased the corporate tax rate by an
additional 5.5 percent (later increased to 6.5 percent) only for
corporations operating in the oil and energy sector with revenues
exceeding twenty-five million Euros (also known as the “Robin Tax”).
The Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the Robin
Tax violated Article 3 and Article 53 of the Constitution, which provide
in respective part that

45. Article 3 states that “[a]ll citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law,
without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social
conditions.” Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.].
46. Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014.
47. Corte Cost., 9 febbraio 2015, n. 10, GU. 2015.
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All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law,
without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion,
personal and social conditions. . . . [and that] Every person shall
contribute to public expenditure in accordance with his/her taxpayer capacity. The taxation system shall be based on criteria of
progression.48

The Court held that the Robin Tax violated both Articles. The court
first recognized that the Robin Tax singled out oil and energy
companies and reiterated its long-standing position that the
government has broad discretion to design different taxes for different
economic sectors. Such distinctions in taxation, however, must be
reasonably justified so as to not become arbitrary discrimination. From
this premise, the Court then analyzed the legislature’s reason for
singling out the oil and energy sectors and then considered the means
chosen to serve such intent.
For the intent inquiry, the Court recognized that it was reasonable
for the government to increase the corporate tax rate on corporations
engaged in the oil and energy businesses because companies in the
energy sector often operate in a quasi-monopoly. This means that
consumers’ demand is inelastic even in response to high prices, and as
a result, these companies garner greater profits than would be possible
in a more efficient market. Moreover, a higher tax rate for bettersituated companies was justified in a period of economic downturn
(such as 2008 when the Robin Tax was enacted) and consistent with the
companies’ respective ability to pay. Accordingly, the Court found that
the intent to impose a higher tax on the oil and energy sectors was
reasonable and proportional to the companies’ ability to pay.
Although the legislature’s intent was legitimate, the Court found
that the Tax’s means were not reasonably related to that intent. First,
the Court criticized the government’s approach as overbroad: Why did
they not limit the Robin Tax to the surplus profits attributable to the
privileged position that the oil and energy companies enjoyed in the
market? Instead, the Robin Tax was an increase of the total tax rate
applicable to those corporations and not a surtax imposed only on the
extra profits attributable to such privileged positions. Second, it was
unreasonable that the Robin Tax was permanent and did not provide a
sunset clause triggered by the end of the economic recession. Therefore,
the Court concluded that the Robin Tax violated Article 3 and Article
48. Article 53 specifically states that “[e]very person shall contribute to public expenditure
in accordance with their capability. The tax system shall be progressive.” Art. 53 Cost.
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53 of the Constitution because although it sought to further a legitimate
intent, the substantive law itself was not reasonably related to that
intent.49
Similarly, in another case, the Italian Court struck down a tax on
the ground of unreasonable means. In Sentenza 83/2015, the petitioner
alleged the unconstitutionality of Article 11(22) of Decree-Law No. 76
(Preliminary Emergency Measures on the Promotion of Employment,
Particularly Among Youth, on Social Cohesion), which imposed a
consumption tax of 58.5 percent on all tobacco surrogate products
(most commonly known as “e-cigarettes”), regardless of their nicotine
content and on all the electronic components of such e-cigarettes.50 The
Italian Court was faced with the question of whether the law violated
Article 3 (the reasonableness principle) and Article 23 of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o obligation of a personal or a
financial nature may be imposed on any person except by law.”51
With respect to Article 3, the Italian Court held that although the
government has the authority and discretion to tax, such power is
limited by Article 3’s reasonableness principle. The Court
explainedthat although the tax on tobacco products may be justified by
the inherent danger of such products, the same reasoning could not be
extended to e-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine. Accordingly, the
Italian Court found the law to be unreasonable because it would apply
to e-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine and to products that do not
share any characteristics with tobacco products (e.g., electronic
components). Because e-cigarettes without nicotine pose less of a
threat to public health, applying the 58.5 percent tax to them as well
would be unconstitutionally overbroad.
Regarding Article 23 of the Constitution, the Italian Court also held
the law unconstitutional because it was overly vague. The imposition of
a consumption tax on all products that could “substitute” for traditional
tobacco products gave excessive discretion to the Italian tax authority
in determining the taxable base and thus violated Article 23 of the
Constitution, which requires that “no obligation . . . may be imposed on
any person except by law.”52

49. Corte Cost., 15 gennaio 2014, n. 6, G.U. 2014. To avoid dire consequences to the Italian
treasury, the Court abrogated the Robin Tax prospectively. Corte Cost., 9 febbraio 2015, n. 10,
GU. 2015.
50. Corte Cost., 15 aprile 2015, n. 83, G.U. 2015
51. Art. 23 Cost.
52. Id.
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In general, these cases are similar to the German cases discussed
above. They involve tax expenditures (or in some instances, tax
penalties) that distinguish among categories of taxpayers and were
deemed constitutionally infirm under the arbitrariness standard. The
general conclusion is that when evaluating tax laws that differentiate
between groups, it is not necessary to measure them against an ideal
tax baseline (such as the Haig Simons definition of income). Rather,
tax laws should be evaluated based on whether the deviation from
equality is proportional to the legislative purpose.
C. Israel
Israel does not have a written constitution, but the Israeli Supreme
Court has held that ordinary laws that infringe on Basic Laws (laws that
were passed by a super-majority and are intended to form building
blocks for a future constitution), such as the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Freedom (1992), can be struck down as unconstitutional if they
deviate from a principle of equality.53 Basic Laws can only be amended
by a legislative super-majority and are designated as forming part of a
future constitution. However, the Israeli Court has been more reluctant
than the German or Italian Courts to declare tax laws unconstitutional
onequal protection grounds. Similar to Germany and Italy, Israeli
courts also apply an arbitrariness standard to determine when a tax law
has improperly infringed on citizens’ constitutional rights—
particularly the principle of equality included in the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom.
The first direct constitutional challenge to an Israeli tax law
stemmed from the 2003 tax reform, which imposed a preferential tax
rate on capital gains from the sale of publicly traded stock. This tax rate
was set at 20 percent, whereas ordinary income (i.e., wages) was taxed
at a rate of 50 percent. Shmuel Kaniel, a math professor at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, and others appealed to the Israeli Court and
argued that the rate disparity was unconstitutional.54
The Israeli Court accepted the claim that in principle the tax rate
disparity was unconstitutional, but upheld the tax based on the
“limitations clause” of the Basic Law, which permits proportional
injuries to rights (i.e., infringements on rights, which are proportional

53. HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal 49(4) PD 221 (1995).
54. HCJ 9333/03 Shmuel Kaniel et al. v. Government 50(1) PD 277 (2005). There is no
standing requirement in Israel, which helps explain how such a case could be brought.
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to the legislative purpose). The Court justified the rate disparity based
on the need to maintain international competitiveness in attracting
capital, the need for a gradual transition from a no-tax environment,
and the concern that invalidating the tax would destabilize the
economy. In this case and others, the Israeli Court seemed reluctant to
apply full-fledged substantive constitutional review to tax cases.55
However, Chief Justice Barak laid out the conditions for a future
constitutional challenge to tax laws on the ground of equal protection.
He emphasized that tax laws are subject to constitutional review, just
like other laws, and continued56
At the present moment, I have not been convinced that there is no
proper relationship [between the injury to rights and the purpose of
the law]. It seems that the tax rates established in amendment 132
do not deviate from the proper balance between the injury to
equality on one hand, and the legislative purpose (international
competitiveness and stock market stability) on the other hand. They
maintain the proper relationship between the injury to the
individual who bears an unequal tax burden and the public benefit
(maintaining international investment in Israel and stock exchange
stability). I said “at the present moment,” because amendment 132
is quite recent, and there is not enough experience to evaluate it. It
is possible, therefore, that with time there will emerge a new set of
circumstances in which the relationship between the injury to
equality and the public benefit will no longer be proper. As it stands
today, we cannot hold that this relationship is improper.

This language lays out the basis for future constitutional challenges
to tax laws on an equal protection basis.57 And indeed in a later case
from 2012, the Israeli Court struck down tax exemptions that were
applied to certain towns but not to others, and without any objective
criteria, as a violation of equal protection. Up to 2012, the Israel
Ministry of Finance, with the approval of the Knesset (Israel
55. See Edrey, supra note 16.
56. HCJ 9333/03 Shmuel Kaniel et al. v. Government 50(1) PD 277 (2005).
57. The Israeli Court also struck down a tax law on constitutional grounds, but the judicial
review was procedural rather than substantive. See HCJ 10042/1 Quintinsky v. Knesset (2017). In
Quintinsky, the petitioners challenged the Multiple Apartments Tax Arrangement, which
imposed a designated tax upon owners of multiple apartments. The Israeli Court held that there
was a substantive defect in the legislative proceedings that went “to the heart of the proceedings”
– a violation of the principle of the participation of opposition Knesset members in the legislative
process – that justified its annulment. It is hard to imagine the U.S. Supreme Court adopting the
attitude of the Israeli Court to Congressional proceedings. After all, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
of 2017 was passed with no hearings and with no meaningful participation by any Democratic
members of Congress, but it is highly unlikely that it could be challenged on these grounds.
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parliament), periodically approved a list of the specific towns that were
entitled to regional tax benefits. The criteria used in making this list was
never published or subject to judicial or public review. Petitioners
argued that this specific list of towns, determined without neutral,
published criteria, constituted potential illegal discrimination in the use
of public funds. The Israeli Court noted that indeed, the list was de facto
discriminatory. It requested that the Ministry amend the law and
establish published criteria, determining that the conferral of tax
benefits without published guidelines constituted illegal discrimination
and violated the equal protection to which Israelis are entitled. The
Court viewed the regional tax benefits as tax expenditures and as a use
of public funds, which justified strict scrutiny.58
In general, the lesson from the comparison is that unlike the U.S.,
other countries evaluate distinctions between taxpayers not as
deviations from an ideal tax baseline, but as deviations from a principle
of equality, and then ask whether such deviations are proportional to
the legislative aim. Such an analysis can also be applied to U.S. tax laws,
as explained below.
II. SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS TO U.S. TAX LAW
In the U.S., when the income tax law distinguishes between groups
of taxpayers, the result is usually defined as a tax expenditure, i.e. a
departure from a normative ideal tax base. Although this is the current
understanding of tax expenditures, we have shown elsewhere that the
concept of tax expenditures was created originally not out of a concern
about deviations from a theoretical definition of income like HaigSimons, but about deviations from horizontal equity, or the idea that
taxpayers with equal incomes should be taxed the same.59 In addition,
most tax expenditures also violate vertical equity principles because
they favor richer taxpayers, and the purpose of having a personal
income tax is to reduce systemic inequality.60
In what follows we will examine some of the larger U.S. tax
expenditures and show that many of them would not survive
constitutional scrutiny under the criteria used by the foreign courts
surveyed above.

58. HCJ 8300/02 Gadban Nasser v. The Government of the State of Israel (2006).
59. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Nir Fishbien, Tax Expenditures and Horizontal Equity: A Lost
Lesson from Stanley S. Surrey (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
60. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 9 (2006).
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A. The Exclusion of Employer Provided Health Care Premiums from
Income
Under current law, employer-paid health insurance premiums and
other medical expenses (including long-term care) are not included in
employee gross income, even though the employer deducts them as a
business expense.61 This exclusion is the largest tax expenditure in the
federal budget, costing $2.786 trillion from 2019 to 2028.62 This
exclusion means that employees who work for an employer that
provides such benefits receive a tax subsidy because they do not have
to include the employer’s contribution to their health insurance and
medical care (for self-insured employers) as income. Employees who
do not receive health benefits and self-employed individuals generally
must pay for health insurance and medical care with after-tax dollars.
The exclusion imposes some major costs. First, as noted above, it leads
to a considerable loss of revenue. Second, it is regressive, because tax
rates rise with income and thus high-income taxpayers benefit most
from the exclusion. Third, it is biased towards more robust insurance
coverage because premiums are paid with before-tax dollars and
therefore the cost does not fall on the taxpayer.
Some might argue that this exclusion is justified on some non-tax
superiorities, for instance, holding together our existing system of
employer-provided insurance. But empirical literature undermines this
position. First, it is unlikely that medium and large firms will wholesale
exit the employer-provided insurance because of other non-tax
benefits, such as the negotiating power obtained with group size,
benefits of group purchase, and ease of plan choice and administration.
Second, when the scale of the non-group market is dramatically
increased by individuals leaving employer-provided insurance, the nongroup market might function better and provide lower prices. Besides,
the promotion of the employer-sponsored insurance system is not
necessarily a benefit to society because it distorts the labor market by
limiting job-to-job mobility and warping retirement decisions.63

61. I.R.C. § 106(a) (2020).
62. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, item 130
(2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Tax-Expenditures-2021.pdf [hereinafter TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS].
63. The economic effects of this tax expenditure seem to be deleterious, because many
employees do not leave their jobs because of the health insurance, even though they would prefer
otherwise. See Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job
Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, in HEALTH POLICY AND THE UNINSURED 97
(Catherine McLaughlin ed., 2004).
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There is no rational justification for U.S. tax law’s distinction
between employer coverage and independently purchased coverage,
other than history and political popularity. To achieve horizontal equity,
Congress should either repeal the expenditure and include the
premiums as income or let people who do not receive such benefits
from their employer create equivalent tax-free health savings accounts.
The goal of the tax law is to encourage individuals to obtain health
insurance coverage, and it is not proportional to this goal to grant
coverage only to those people whose employers pay into their health
plans.
B. The Exclusion of Gifts and Bequests from Income
Generally, and under a Haig-Simons definition of income as the
sum of consumption and the increase in savings, gifts and bequests
should be included in income.64 Under current law, the value of
property acquired by a gift or bequest is excluded from taxable income
(but also not deductible to the donor).65 The Department of Treasury
estimates the cost of those tax expenditures (based on carryover basis
and the potential capital gains on gifts) to be $29.35 billion from 2019
to 2028.66 This exclusion is hard to justify as it perpetuates generational
wealth and benefits the rich who inherit substantial resources,
excluding everyone else. The federal estate tax only applies to the
super-rich and could be abolished if gifts and bequests were included
in income. Accordingly, the omission of gifts and bequests reduces the
redistributive power of the income tax and raises questions of equity.
Some may justify the exclusion on the ground that the donor has
already paid the tax by making a gift out of after-tax income. Yet this
argument fails to address the problem of unequal tax treatment
between a donee who lives off the munificence of others and an
employee who works hard to finance herself.67 Taxing the hard working
employee but exempting the free giving donor is an apparent violation
of horizontal equity absent valid purpose.
No rational basis can be identified for this exclusion. Although
64. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 200 (1985).
65. I.R.C § 102 (1986).
66. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 75. Under the baseline tax
system, unrealized capital gains would be taxed when assets are transferred by gift. In contrast,
under current law, when a gift of appreciated asset is made, the donor’s basis in the transferred
property carries over to the donee. The carryover of the donor’s basis allows a continued deferral
of unrealized capital gains.
67. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 201.

AVI-YONAH_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

84

3/17/2021 6:44 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

relieving certain intra-family affectionate gifts from taxation might be
a valid purpose, excluding all gifts would be disproportionate to this
intent, because it covers gifts that are not motivated by familial
affection and excludes from income increases in ability to pay that are
not excluded in any other contexts. Congress should thus repeal this
exclusion on horizontal equity grounds.
C. The Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Bonds from Income
Under current law, interest earned on state and local government
bonds is generally tax-exempt.68 This is a tax expenditure that will cost
the federal government $397.87 billion from 2019 to 2028.69 This
expenditure is meant to indirectly subsidize state and local government;
however, that only works when the difference in the interest rate
between taxable and tax-exempt bonds is equal to the top marginal tax
rate, which only happens if individuals subject to the top rate purchase
all the tax-exempt bonds.70 If the difference is less than the marginal tax
rate, that is because individuals outside the top tax bracket purchased
such bonds, so some proportion of the tax expenditure would actually
benefit the super-wealthy and not state and local government. Less
wealthy people who purchase such bonds do not benefit because the
difference in interest rates is equal to the avoided tax.71
Congress should abolish this exclusion on horizontal equity
grounds because it is not proportional to its purpose. To be
proportional to its purpose, this exclusion be more efficient: Congress
could use the revenue obtained from the repeal of this exclusion to
directly subsidize state and local governments.72 As long as the
exemption of the interest inures not to the benefit of state and local
government but rather to rich individuals, the exemption cannot be
justified as advancing the legislative goal of helping state and local
governments.

68. I.R.C. § 103 (1988).
69. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 169.
70. Clifton Fleming Jr and Robert J Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and
Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 446–47 (2008).
71. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 211.
72. JOHN K. MCNULTY & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 101 (7th ed. 2004).
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D. The Deductibility of Home Mortgage Interest and Local Property
Taxes
Notwithstanding the general rule that expenses incurred in relation
to untaxed investment (such as the investment of purchasing an owneroccupied home) are not deductible, current law allows an owneroccupant to deduct, under certain circumstances, mortgage interest
paid on her primary residence. Additionally, an owner-occupant may
take a deduction for local property taxes paid on real property (the
2017 tax reform capped the deductibility of any taxes paid in any
taxable year, including for local property taxes, to $10,000).73 The
combined cost of these tax expenditures to the federal government is
$818.45 billion between 2019 and 2028.74 These deductions create an
unprincipled distinction between homeowners who can claim them and
renters who cannot.75 Homeowners also benefit from the exclusion of
the imputed income from home ownership (worth $1.536 trillion over
2019 to 2028).76
The alleged purpose of these deductions is to encourage home
ownership—to make buying a home more accessible—but empirical
research conducted in the U.S. shows that these deductions may have a
larger effect on the size of homes purchased than on the decision to
become a homeowner.77 In other words, these deductions are inefficient
and ineffective at achieving their stated purpose, as they
disproportionately benefit wealthier individuals in purchasing more
expensive property. An alternative policy explanation for the mortgage
interest deduction is the promotion of tax equity between outright
homeowners, who enjoy untaxed imputed income, and mortgaged
homeowners, who do not have net imputed income. If the logic
underlying this explanation were valid, rental costs should also be
deductible for the equity between outright homeowners and renters.
Permitting deductions only for mortgaged homeowners is unfair to
73. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3), 164(a).
74. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, items 60-61 (for home mortgage
interest ($597,610) and local property taxes ($220,840), respectively).
75. See also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 233. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
introduced the low-income housing credit, which generally allowed a nonrefundable credit for
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated qualified low-income housing projects. See
Section 42. However, the credit is considered relatively unsubstantial. For more, see Briefing
Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-incomehousing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
76. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 64.
77. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND
PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 14–15 (2014).
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renters and is not predicated on a rational distinction between the two
consumer groups. Whether one is paying a mortgage or paying rent,
they are paying for housing all the same. Congress should amend these
deductions to comply with horizontal equity by either allowing similar
deductions for renters or removing such deductions entirely.
E. Step Up of Basis at Death
Under current law, capital gains on assets held at the owner’s death
are not subject to the capital gains tax. Nonetheless, the cost basis of
the appreciated assets is adjusted to the market value at the owner’s
date of death (stepped-up basis), which becomes the basis for the
heirs.78 This tax expenditure will cost the federal government $622.2
billion from 2019 to 2028.79 This tax expenditure has no rational basis,
because it is possible to calculate the original basis (cost) of real and
personal property. The exclusion means that everyone is subject to the
capital gains tax except heirs, and that people will be reluctant to sell
assets when they are old even if they would normally prefer to
downsize their home. Again, this exclusion mostly helps the rich
because everyone gets an exclusion of the first $500,000 on the sale of
a primary residence. It is not proportional to any articulable legislative
goal to allow all heirs to sell appreciated properties without paying any
tax, while non-heirs have to pay full tax on the appreciation in their
capital assets. Congress should abolish this exclusion on horizontal
equity grounds.80
F. The Capital Gains and Dividends Preference
Under current law, qualified dividends are taxed at a preferentially
low rate—not higher than 20 percent—rather than the marginal
individual tax rate (up to 39.6 percent). In addition, capital gains on
assets held for more than one year are generally taxed at the same
preferentially low rate. Here, the total cost to the government will be
$1.536 trillion between 2019 and 2028.81 Preferentially low rate on
dividend income and capital gains benefit the wealthy, because large
portions of their income are derived from such passive sources.
Nonetheless, as long as we have a realization requirement, the capital

78. I.R.C. § 1014 (2015).
79. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, item 74.
80. See also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 64, at 254.
81. See TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 62, items 71−72 (for qualified dividends
($384,120) and capital gains ($1,152,610), respectively).
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gains preference mitigates lock-in, protects from inflation, and prevents
bunching.82 In addition, the capital gains and dividends rates achieve
partial integration of the corporate and shareholder tax. Congress
should evaluate these issues and the inequity they create, and, at a
minimum, reduce the disparity between the capital gains and ordinary
income rates.
III. THE ANSWER
So should the U.S. follow other countries and constitutionalize
income tax law? In other areas, the U.S. has reduced American tax
exceptionalism, for example by adopting partial integration of
corporate/shareholder taxes in 2003 and a participation exemption in
2017. Should federal tax laws be subject to constitutional scrutiny?
In the current state of affairs, the answer must be “no.” The stakes
are too high because the Court gets the final word. And the current
Court is not up to the task. First, the majority of the current Justices
incline toward textualism, which would prevent them from asking what
Congress intended in, for example, enacting the home mortgage
interest deduction. Inquiry into legislative purpose is essential to
measuring deviations from equality against legislative intent under a
constitutional proportionality standard.
Second, the Court lacks a well-developed doctrine of
proportionality.83 Even if it found that a given deviation from equality
was not required to advance Congress’ purpose, the Court lacks the
analytical tools to conduct a nuanced inquiry about the extent of the
injury and whether other means could be used. In addition, some judges
may feel that evaluating the costs and benefits of a departure from
equality under proportionality is more appropriate for a legislature
than for the judicial branch.
Third, the Court does not understand tax law. This is evident in
some of its recent federal tax decisions like Gitlitz v. Commissioner84
and PPL Corp. v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,85
which were excessively formalistic and reached absurd results.86 The

82. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & DMITRY ZELIK, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES 363 (Michael Littlewood & Craig Elliffe eds., 2017).
83. For a thorough explanation of proportionality, see generally AHARON BARAK,
PROPORTIONALITY (2012).
84. 531 U.S. 206 (2001) (8-1 decision).
85. 569 U.S. 329 (2013) (unanimous decision).
86. Most tax scholars believe both were wrongly decided. See, e.g., McMahon, Jr., Martin
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fact that the Court rarely takes up federal tax cases does not help, nor
does the fact that no Justice and few clerks have training in tax. Even
Justice Ginsburg, whose late husband was an renowned tax lawyer,
joined the misguided majority in Gitlitz.
But this does not mean that the constitutional inquiry is worthless.
Congress is charged with upholding the Constitution too, and Congress
can ask when considering a tax expenditure (a) what its purpose in
deviating from equality is, and (b) whether the deviation is
proportional and necessary. These are the two main issues underlying
the foreign decisions surveyed above, and Congress can learn from the
way these courts analyzed the issues of equality and proportionality.
Congress also has the requisite tax expertise. In fact, this could be a new
process for the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: For every tax
expenditure, the Joint Committee should ask not just how much it costs
in foregone revenue, but also whether the deviation from equality is
justified in terms of Congress’ purpose. A report along these lines may
persuade members of Congress to stop listening to lobbyists and cut
back on some of the more egregious tax expenditures.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to address the question of why the
Supreme Court has not held that a federal income tax provision was
unconstitutional since 1920. It then explains how supreme courts in
three other liberal democracies (Germany, Italy and Israel) measure
tax provisions against a constitutional standard of equality by first
analyzing the legislative purpose behind the rule and then assessing
whether the departure from equality is proportional to the legislative
purpose. Finally, the article gives a preliminary evaluation of some of
the larger US tax expenditures and shows that they would have been
ruled unconstitutional had the same standard used abroad been
applied to them. The article concludes by urging Congress to assess tax
laws, and especially tax expenditures, against a constitutional equal
protection standard, since the Supreme Court as currently constituted
is not up to this task.
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